The United States experienced firsthand the effects of bioterrorism in 2001, when envelopes containing anthrax spores were sent through the U.S. Postal Service. In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush announced federal implementation of an early warning network of sensors to detect a biological attack as part of a new biodefense program. This network of early warning sensors is known as the BioWatch program. In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deployed the first generation of BioWatch air samplers. However, the current version of this technology requires daily manual collection and testing of air filters from each monitor, and DHS has considered newer automated technologies that produce results more quickly and at lower cost.
The primary benefit of early detection through autonomous detection lies in reducing the casualty rate and number of fatalities following a release.
Nature of the Biothreat and the Biowatch Program
An overview of the BioWatch program and background on the nature of the bioterrorism threat were provided, and several key points were highlighted by the speakers, including the following:
• the biothreat has not diminished-it is evolving and becoming more "democratized," meaning that less-skilled individuals are able to carry out a bioattack;
• BioWatch, as part of a comprehensive approach, provides an opportunity to mitigate the consequences of a bioattack;
• coordination and cooperation between federal, state, and local stakeholders is a requirement and a benefit of a successful BioWatch program; and
• reducing time to response could save lives (see figure) .
Public Health Perspective
Local and state public health agencies sit on the front lines of the BioWatch system. Some workshop participants stated that any autonomous detection system will have to meet the needs of those agencies in order to instill confidence in the results from such a system. Public health officials need to be equipped to make appropriate decisions following declaration of a BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR), which is a verified positive result from a BioWatch collector. A BAR is seen as having two components: 1) in a laboratory setting, a reliable, reportable laboratory result has been produced; and 2) in an operational setting, a result can be acted upon within the context of other key pieces of information, such as available intelligence information, presence of the organism in the natural environment at that location, and any human or veterinary surveillance data related to the organism detected.
overview of each family of technology is provided in the table (see page 4).
Panelists noted several potential challenges to consider for an autonomous detection system including: the integration of multiple components or technologies; the ability to effectively maximize sample concentration and minimize sample contamination from the sample to the environmental background; the development of quality databases and bioinformatics tools; and conducting effective assay validation.
Finally, many panelists and participants requested a multi-dimensional testing approach in order to increase the reliability of a BAR and the overall confidence in the system. Participants reiterated that:
• extensive and repeated field testing will be necessary for a detection system;
• it is important to involve the end user-public health-in system development and testing; and
• DHS is encouraged to look beyond the familiar technologies and development pathways.
Final Thoughts
This workshop provided the opportunity for participants to examine a broad range of technologies-from developing to mature -in the biodetection field and to get a sense of the technology pipeline. This opportunity may help BioWatch program officials be better informed when deciding which areas of the program require additional focus. The panelists made several key points:
• The technical data that leads to a BAR is just one part of the information that is needed; context is important for decision making.
• Public health officials are in the position of making high-consequence decisions in the face of uncertainty. Therefore, the information provided must be accurate and reliable.
• Public health stakeholders-as the end userswant to be engaged at all stages of the process, including design, development, and testing.
• Desired features and considerations for a detection system include faster detection time; remote access; instrument-specific performance data; information on agent identity, viability-alive or dead-and susceptibility to medical countermeasures; spatial resolution, meaning information about release location and amount; and archived sample data for later testing.
Potential Technologies for the Biowatch Program
Workshop participants discussed the current state of the art, exploring the potential uses of four families of technology in the BioWatch program: nucleic acid signatures; immunoassays and protein signatures; genomic sequencing; and mass spectrometry. Participants considered how these technologies might be strategically combined or deployed to optimize their contributions to an effective environmental detection capability. An
